A survey of the liberalisation of public enterprises in the UK since 1979

This paper examines the course of the deregulation and privatisation of public enterprises in the UK since 1979. The UK privatisation programme has been the most significant in the OECD involving the transfer of ownership of over 7% of GDP from the public to the private sectors. We examine the history and genesis of this programme, the development of the regulatory system based around RPI-X price control and the evidence on the effects of the privatisation. We conclude by evaluating the policy in the terms of its original aims. We find that public enterprise privatisation successfully reduced government involvement in industry, led to increased economic efficiency and a reduced fiscal deficit. Less clearly, it contributed to the curbing of Trade Union power and wider share ownership. Most significantly of all, as the most sustained and consistent policy of the 1979-97 Conservative governments, it gained sustained advantage for pro-market political forces in the UK

Evaluating the Evidence on Electricity Reform: Lessons for the South East Europe (SEE) Market

This paper discusses the evidence on electricity reform and relates it to the current situation of the South East Europe (SEE) electricity market. We begin by discussing the main elements of the European Union (EU) electricity reform model. Then we go on to discuss emerging good practice in the regulation of national electricity markets in the EU. This is important because it reflects the key role placed on independent regulation of the electricity sector in the EU reform model. Next, we evaluate the empirical evidence on the success of the EU reform model in particular before and the success of electricity reforms more generally. This leads on to a discussion of the particular context of SEE electricity reform and what specific issues this raises. We conclude with a discussion of the importance of more general institutional context of SEE electricity reform. The paper suggests that it will be a substantial, but worthwhile, challenge to create a workable supra-national electricity market in the region

Liberalisation and Regulation in Electricity Systems: How can we get the balance right?

This paper explores the issue of the balance between liberalisation and regulation in electricity systems, which is the essence of much of the detailed policies which are implemented in the sector. By liberalisation I take to mean the use of market or quasi-market mechanisms as part of a reform of the sector, by regulation I take to mean regulatory intervention to restrain the operation of market signals which would otherwise have operated in the absence of regulation. The paper takes an international perspective to look at the case for liberalisation, the case for regulation and the evidence on the effects of liberalisation. It concludes with an assessment on the future for electricity liberalisation. This paper forms the foreward to Sioshansi, F.P. (2008) (ed.), Competitive Electricity Markets: Design, Implementation, Performance, Oxford: Elsevier and makes reference to the papers in that volume

Electricity Reform in Chile: Lessons for Developing Countries

Chile was the first country in the world to implement a comprehensive reform of itselectricity sector in the recent period. Among developing countries only Argentina hashad a comparably comprehensive and successful reform. This paper traces the history ofthe Chilean reform, which began in 1982, and assesses its progress and its lessons. Weconclude that the reform has been very successful. We suggest lessons for the generation,transmission and distribution sectors, as well as the economic regulation of electricity andthe general institutional environment favourable to reform. We note that while the initialmarket structure and regulatory arrangements did give rise to certain problems, theoverall experience argues strongly for the private ownership and operation of theelectricity industry

Deregulation and R&D in Network Industries: The Case of the Electricity Industry

Electricity reform has coincided with a significant decline in energy R&D activities. Technical progress is crucial for tackling many energy and environmental issues as well as for long-term efficiency improvement. This paper reviews the industrial organisation literature on innovation to explore the causes of this decline, and shows that it was predicted by the pre-reform literature. More recent evidence endorses this conclusion. At the same time, R&D productivity and innovative output appear to have improved in both electric utilities and equipment suppliers, in line with general improvements in the operating efficiency of the sector. Despite this, a lasting decline in basic R&D and innovation input into basic research may negatively affect development of radical technological innovation in the long run. There is a need for reorientation of energy technology policies and spending toward more basic research, engaging more firms in R&D, encouraging collaborative research, and exploring public private partnerships

Incentive Regulation of Electricity Distribution Networks: Lessons of Experience from Britain

This paper reviews the recent experience of the UK electricity distribution sector under incentive regulation. The UK has a significant and transparent history in implementing incentive regulation in the period since 1990. We demonstrate the successes of this period in reducing costs, prices and energy losses while maintaining quality of service. We also draw out the lessons for other countries in implementing distribution sector reform. We conclude by discussing the place of incentive regulation of networks within the wider reform context, the required legislative framework, the need for appropriate unbundling, the importance of quality of service incentives, the regulatory information requirements and the role of sector rationalisation

Benchmarking and Regulation of Electricity Transmission and Distribution Utilities: Lessons from International Experience

Since the early 1980's, many countries have implemented electricity sector reform, many of which have bundled generation, transmission, distribution and supply activities, and have introduced competition in generation and supply. An increasing number of countries are also adopting incentive regulation to promote efficiency improvement in the natural monopoly activities - transmission and distribution. Incentive regulation almost invariably involves benchmarking or comparison of actual vs. some reference performance. This paper reviews the main approaches to incentive regulation and discusses various benchmarking methods. We also present the finding of a survey of the use of benchmarking methods in the OECD and few other countries. Our survey finds a variety of methods used by the electricity regulators although with a notable preference for the non-parametric methods. We then draw conclusions based on the finding of the survey highlighting the main outstanding issues and lessons for best practice implementation of benchmarking in electricity regulation

Do Mergers Improve Efficiency? Evidence from Restructuring the U.S. Electric Power Sector

This paper analyses the performance impact of the merger wave which took place in the US electricity industry during the period 1994-2003. It does so by analyzing the impact on operating and total cost in electricity distribution. While there are past studies of efficiency and productivity effects, as well as of prices, profits, and other outcomes, this study differs in several ways. First, the database consists of many merging and non-merging firms, rather than only a few on which to base inferences. Second, all of these mergers arise in a single industry, greatly facilitating controlled comparison. Third, we have data on the several years of pre-merger and post-merger efficiency of the specific merging units, unlike virtually all past studies. And finally, we employ a powerful nonparametric technique - data envelopment analysis - to measure the efficiency of each operating unit. The results indicate that electricity mergers are not consistent with improved cost performance